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INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AND 
THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION: NAFTA AND 
GUATEMALA, TWO CASE STUDIES 
Lance Compa* 
INTRODUCTION 
Worker rights advocates in trade unions, human rights groups, and 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played an increas-
ingly important role in promoting internationally established fair labor 
standards as a factor in international trade.1 Particularly in the United 
States, recent developments have widened the scope for action on labor 
rights in a transnational economy.2 Advocates of international fair labor 
standards have challenged the traditional right of countries to address 
their labor laws and labor relations as solely internal matters.3 They 
have sought to constrain the right of multinational corporations to imple-
ment labor policies based solely upon the laws of each nation where 
they operate, especially where laws are designed to repress rather than 
protect workers,4 and provide a competitive edge in international trade.5 
* Director, International Labor Rights Advocates, a legal project of the Inter-
national Labor Rights Education and Research Fund; Lecturer, Yale School of Organi-
zation and Management 
1. See JOHN CAVANAGH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS EDUCATION 
AND RESEARCH FUND, TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING 
WORLD ECONOMY 41-43 (1988) [hereinafter TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS] (explaining the 
origins of the promotion of worker rights in international trade); see generally UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (Stephen Herzenberg & Jorge F. Perez-Lopez cds., 1990) [herein-
after LABOR STANDARDS] (providing a comprehensive introduction to issues of worker 
rights in global trade); Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the Interna-
tional Economy: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. REV. 31 (1989) (analyz-
ing and defending international labor rights advocacy). 
2. See TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at 42. 
3. See TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at 54-59 (recommending increased 
publication of foreign labor rights violations and the consideration of these violations 
when the United States conducts trade negotiations). 
4. See TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at 28-40 (reviewing repressive 
labor laws and practices in Haiti, Chile, South Korea, Guatemala, Taiwan, and South 
Africa). 
5. Rep. Don J. Pease, Preface to TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at viii 
117 
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Opponents of international fair labor standards contend that each na-
tion has the sovereign right to order its labor relations in accordance 
with domestic economic policies and development strategies.6 Most la-
bor laws reflect this domestic approach.7 United States domestic regula-
tions and laws, for example, regulate union organizing, collective bar-
gaining, and other features of labor-management relations, arid also set 
wage and hour levels, occupational safety and health rules, and other 
minimum workplace standards. 
As the United States has applied worker rights provisions of its trade 
laws to other countries, some leaders in those countries have responded 
with charges that the United States acts hypocritically.8 They further 
contend that the United States Government fails to ratify most of the 
Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)9 and is 
(arguing that countries which trade with the United States and deny basic labor rights 
to their citizens are engaging in unfair competition). Labor rights advocates argue that 
countries and corporations can gain a competitive advantage by employing "social 
dumping" tactics, such as banning strikes or independent union organizing, holding 
wages below a genuinely fair return on the workers' productivity, or permitting forced 
labor or child labor. Id. 
6. See Gary S. Fields, Labor Standards, Economic Development and Internation-
al Trade, in LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 19, 31-32 (stating that raising 
trade-linked international labor standards may conflict with a country's economic ob-
jectives and likely will protect one part of the workforce at the expense of another). 
7. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957) 
(declaring that United States labor law "is concerned with industrial strife between 
American employers and employees"). In Benz, the Supreme Court held that the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 did not cover labor disputes between a 
foreign ship and its foreign crew and dismissed a claim by a foreign sailor to enforce 
worker rights under United States law while in a United States port. Id. 
8. See Karl Schoenberger, The Model Here Isn*t America, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
1992, at Al (quoting Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed's statement to a 
group of American businessmen that "[t]he hedonistic materialism of present (Western) 
models [of development] is not for us."); see also Paul Lewis, Splits May Dampen 
Rights Conference; Some Standards Don*t Apply to Third World, It Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 6, 1993, at Al, A14 (reporting statements that "different cultures have different 
human rights standards while insisting that developing countries also have an absolute 
right to assistance with their economic development"). 
9. See EDWARD POTTER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE IMPACT ON U.S. LAW AND PRACTICES OF RATIFI-
CATION OF ILO CONVENTIONS NO. 87 AND NO. 98 (1984). A specialized agency of 
the United Nations, the ILO is the principal multilateral body devoted to labor rights 
and labor standards. While its conventions and recommendations reflect consensus 
among government, employer, and trade union representatives to annual ILO confer-
ences, the ILO has no power to enforce the standards that it sets. See Stephen I. 
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itself guilty of widespread labor rights violations.10 
Labor rights advocates in the United States and allied organizations 
abroad attempting to establish international fair labor standards run up 
against traditional notions of sovereignty in formulating national labor 
policies and development strategies. In the same way that entrenched 
sovereignty principles gradually yielded to international human rights 
claims after World War E," sovereignty is now being challenged by 
claims of international labor rights in the field of employment standards 
and industrial relations. 
This Article seeks to illuminate this challenge to sovereignty in two 
case studies of labor rights advocacy. Part I sets the stage with an 
overview of the growing importance of labor rights and labor standards 
as the world economy shifts from a nation-based economy to a single, 
global economy. Part II examines the case studies: the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Guatemala. NAFTA is a case 
study of advocacy to establish fair international labor standards. The 
Schlossberg, United States Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. 
LAB. LJ. 48-49, 57-58 (1989) (providing a brief history and description of the ILO 
and discussing the role of the United States in the ILO's development); see also 
DAVID A . MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE I.L.O. AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
WORLD COMMUNITY (1969) (providing a historical overview of the ILO). The United 
States has ratified eleven of 174 ILO Conventions, seven of them relating to condi-
tions in the maritime industry. Of the rest, one ratification concerned approval of ILO 
constitutional changes. The other three are of wider significance: Convention No. 144 
on Tripartite Consultations, committing to government-business-labor consultation on 
labor affairs (ratified 1988); No. 160 on Labor Statistics, standardizing statistical re-
porting requirements and measurement methods (ratified 1990); and, most significantly, 
No. 105 on forced labor (ratified 1991). United States multinational corporations ac-
ceded to ratification of Convention No. 105, given the universality of strictures 
against forced labor, but strongly resisted United States ratification of ILO Conven-
tions favorable to trade unions. 
10. See International Union Report Places U.S. Among Violators of Basic Labor 
Rights, 1 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA), at 441 (May 5, 1993) (reporting that the Internation-
al Confederation of Free Trade Unions cited the United States as one of 87 countries 
violating fundamental trade union rights as recognized by the Conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation in its "Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights"); International Unions Accuse Food Lion of Unfair Practices in United States, 
1 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA), at 577-78 (June 16, 1993) (reporting that Food Lion, a 
United States subsidiary of a Belgian retailer, is guilty of unfair labor practices and 
refuses to deal with trade unions). 
11. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE 
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 4-5 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d cd. 1992) (de-
scribing the emergence of universal human rights after World War II). 
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Guatemala case study exemplifies advocacy by U.S. labor rights support-
ers on behalf of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, where recourse 
is sought through worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws and 
through a litigation strategy that views U.S. courts as a forum for assert-
ing international labor rights claims. 
I. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF WORKERS* RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
As the world moves toward a global economy, differences in labor 
standards, worker organization, and labor relations policies among coun-
tries at varying levels of development become critical variables in trade 
and investment decision making. The NAFTA and Guatemala labor 
rights cases that are the focus of this Article do not arise in a vacuum: 
these cases arise in a context of increasing importance of labor rights on 
the international agenda.12 
A. ORGANIZED LABOR, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS 
In many countries, organized labor movements play an important role 
in influencing trade and development strategies. For example, workers 
and unions often mount sharp resistance to austerity and privatization 
policies imposed on their governments by the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and other global lending agencies.13 
12. The United States has recognized the importance of labor rights by linking them 
to preferential treatment for developing countries in trade programs. Labor rights provi-
sions in U.S. trade laws specify five "internationally recognized worker rights" whose 
observance conditions a country's beneficiary trade status with the United States: 
(A) the right of association; 
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; 
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and 
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, 
work, and occupational safety and health. 
19 U.S.C. § 2462(4) (1988). 
13. See, e.g., James Brooke, Brazil Ignores Protests and Begins to Privatize* N.Y, 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at D2 (reporting on outbreaks of violence in protest of Brazil's 
privatization plan); Shelley Emling, Latin Labor Strife Expected to Intensify, J. COM., 
Dec. 30, 1991, at Al (reporting that Central American governments will "lock horns" 
with labor organizations over plans to sell inefficient state enterprises to pay back 
foreign debts to international lenders); Job Protests in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
17, 1991, at D5 (stating that thousands of employees of state-owned banks had gone 
on strike to protest privatization plans which they feared threatened their jobs). 
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Traditional union tactics of organizing, bargaining, and striking also 
have important effects on trade and investment. Korean workers, after 
decades of suppression by military governments, countered the suppres-
sion with a broad movement of strikes in the 1980s and organizing 
campaigns that transformed Korea's export base.14 This movement 
forced sharp salary increases and challenged management's autocratic 
control of the workplace.15 Companies retaliated by moving operations 
to Thailand, Malaysia, Central America, and other lower-cost export 
processing areas.16 As turmoil continued to jeopardize the stability de-
sired by international investors, the Korean government responded by 
launching new crackdowns on organized labor.17 Like Korea, the Ma-
laysian Government intervened by prohibiting independent, freely-chosen 
unions in the growing semiconductor industry. This measure created 
investment problems in Malaysia and placed the government in a pre-
carious situation. If Malaysia continued to prohibit the formation of 
national unions, the United States considered imposing trade sanctions 
for labor rights violations. If Malaysia lifted the ban on genuine unions, 
United States-based multinational companies threatened to leave.18 Polit-
ical reform and union tactics presented governments with difficult ques-
tions on how to address labor rights in the context of international trade. 
14. See generally GEORGE E. OGLE, SOUTH KOREA: DISSENT WITHIN THE ECO-
NOMIC MIRACLE 115-53 (discussing the Korean labor movement from 1987 to 1989). 
15. See Steven R. Weisman, Korea's Boom Slows Just a Bit; Labor Unrest Jolts 
A Surging Economy, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1989, at 35-36 (describing strikes and 
salary demands, and their impact on the Korean economy). 
16. See Peter Maass, Foreign Firms a Target in South Korea, WASH. POST, May 
21, 1989, at H3 (describing plant shutdowns and relocations by U.S. firms in Korea). 
17. See IMF Welcomes ILO Adjudication Calling for Worker Rights in Korea, 
INT'L METALWORKERS FED. No. 4, Mar. 22, 1993 (press release) (describing ILO 
findings of continuing worker rights violations in Korea). 
18. See Jeyamalar Kandiah, National Union's Out; Electronic Workers Can Form 
Only In-House Unions: Kim Sai, STAR (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 20, 1988 (stating that 
the Malaysian Government announced that electronic workers could form in-house 
unions but not a national union); see also International Labor Rights Education and 
Research Fund, Petition Before the United States Trade Representative for Malaysia's 
Violations of the Worker Rights Provision of the Generalized System of Preferences, 
June 1, 1990 (requesting that Malaysia's status as a beneficiary of the Generalized 
System of Preferences be terminated because Malaysia's non-compliance with worker 
rights standards). 
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B. WORKER EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
1. Child and Forced Labor 
A tactic that may affect investment and directly provide a country 
with a competitive advantage in international trade is the exploitation of 
workers. For example, the ILO19 determined that the exploitative use of 
child labor was a growing factor in world trade,20 and several media 
reports in recent years have substantiated these accusations.21 The use 
of children younger than age thirteen to produce clothing, hand-woven 
caipets, and other products in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other 
Asian countries has provoked legislation in Congress to outlaw the im-
portation of goods produced in this manner into the United States.22 
The United States also has disapproved of countries that employ pris-
on or forced labor. The use of prison labor in China to manufacture 
goods for the United States market has led to congressional challenges 
to China's most favored nation (MFN) trade status.23 Similarly, charges 
of forced labor of Haitian sugar cane cutters in the Dominican Republic 
has prompted the United States to threaten export sanctions.24 Finally, 
19. See supra note 9 (discussing the functions and effectiveness of the ILO). 
20. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, WORLD LABOR REPORT 13 
(1992) (noting that hundreds of millions of children are at work throughout the 
world). As many as eleven percent of the children in various Asian countries, twenty 
percent of the children in certain African countries, and up to twenty-six percent of 
the children in some Latin American countries are members of the workforce. Id 
21. See, e.g., Edward A. Gargan, Bound to Looms by Poverty and Fear, Boys in 
India Make a Few Men Rich, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1992, at A8 (illustrating the harsh 
conditions under which children are forced to work in India); Gina Kolata, More 
Children Are Employed, Often Perilously, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, §1 at 1 (expos-
ing the use of child labor in the United States). 
22. See S. REP. NO. 613, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1993) (prohibiting the 
entry into the United States market of products from industries suspected of using 
child labor). 
23. See Daniel Southerland, China Said to Still Use Forced Labor: Report Con-
tends Exports Violate Pact, Threaten Favored Trade Status, WASH. POST, May 19, 
1993, at F3 (reporting that the Clinton Administration was contemplating the revo-
cation of China's most favored nation status in part because of China's continued 
illegal exportation to the United States of goods produced by forced labor). 
24. See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A CHILDHOOD ABDUCTED: 
CHILDREN CUTTING SUGAR CANE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 77-80 (1991) (ex-
plaining that the United States Trade Representative nearly revoked the Dominican 
Republic's trade preference status under the General System of Preferences and the 
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millions of workers around the world are offered advance payments of 
salary and then held in debt bondage by their employers.25 
2. Discrimination and Additional Worker Abuses in Developing 
Countries 
Claims of discrimination in the workplace also have contributed to the 
recognition of labor rights as an international dilemma. Apartheid in 
South Africa, for example, has been a target of trade sanctions for many 
years. Workplace discrimination against Black South Africans prompted 
anti-apartheid advocates in the United States to promulgate the Sullivan 
Principles, which stated that U.S. corporations voluntarily should enforce 
non-discrimination practices in their operations in South Africa.25 In 
1986, Congress passed more expansive, mandatory sanctions.27 
The massive transfer of operations from developed to developing 
countries in the garment, manufacturing, and electronic assembly indus-
tries28 has led to widespread claims of sex discrimination against wom-
en workers, who make up the majority of the workforce in these facto-
ries.29 Seen as submissive to male authority, women workers are 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, because it was alleged that the country was not adhering 
to basic international standards of worker rights); NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN 
REFUGEES, AMERICAS WATCH, A TROUBLED YEAR: HAITIANS IN THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 5 (1992) (attacking the failure of the United States to use its influence as 
the Dominican Republic's largest trading partner to protect the basic human rights 
owed to the Haitian workers). 
25. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, WORLD LABOR REPORT 11 
(1993) (explaining that, due to low wages and practices that require payments from 
laborers for tools and fine workers for unsatisfactory work, laborers are never able to 
repay their debts); see also Molly Moore, Casting Off the Caste System; Indian 
Movement Teaching Bonded Laborers to Rebel, WASH. POST, Nov, 17, 1992, at Al 
(providing specific examples of debt bondage in India). 
26. See Daniel Pink, The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good for America Good 
for General Motors?, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 180, 182-85 (1990) (outlining the 
Sullivan Principles and discussing their success in achieving certain improvements in 
working conditions). 
27. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151(d), 5001-5116 (1988). 
28. See JOSEPH GRUNWALD & KENNETH FLAMM, THE GLOBAL FACTORY: FOR-
EIGN ASSEMBLY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 217-37 (1985) (differentiating the means of 
production in the semiconductor industry in the developing world from that in the 
industrial world). 
29. See Kathryn B. Ward, Women in the Global Economy, in 3 WOMEN AND 
WORK: AN ANNUAL REVIEW 28-32 (Barbara A. Gutek, Ann H. Stromberg & Laurie 
Lanvood eds., 1988) (discussing economic subjugation of women in the global assem-
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thought to be hostile to labor unions and are vulnerable to sexual ex-
ploitation by supervisors.30 
In addition to discrimination in the workplace, payment of minimum 
wages, excessive working hours and poor occupational health and safety 
standards also can affect trade and investment patterns. During the fall 
of 1992, United States television shows 60 Minutes and Nightline broad-
cast dramatic revelations of United States government assistance to Cen-
tral American countries luring businesses from the United States.31 In 
one telling sequence, a hidden camera and microphone at a trade show 
sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development 
(AID) recorded representatives of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
underbidding each other with minimum wage quotes, beginning at ninety 
cents and falling to fifty-seven cents per hour.32 The controversy be-
came a potent issue in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign33 and 
provoked immediate congressional action ordering AID to halt such 
assistance.34 
bly line). 
30. See M. PATRICIA FERNANDEZ KELLY, FOR WE ARE SOLD, I AND M Y PEO-
PLE: WOMEN AND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO'S FRONTIER (1983) (documenting the plight 
of female workers in the garment industry in Mexico); RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL 
FACTORY: ANALYSIS AND ACTION FOR A NEW ECONOMIC ERA 11-12 (1990) (discuss-
ing and criticizing assertions of a "natural docility" of women workers in Third World 
factories). 
31. Nightline: Paying to Lose Our Jobs (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 29-30, 
1992 [hereinafter Nightline] (reporting that money from the United States Agency for 
International Development is given to foreign governments to finance their promotion 
of a better business climate for United States manufacturers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean Basin); 60 Minutes: Hiring Rosa Martinez (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 
27, 1992) (documenting that the United States Government is promoting the export of 
textile factories to Central America and the Caribbean Basin by providing companies 
with low-interest loans, as well as by advertising the availability of inexpensive labor 
in foreign countries). 
32. Nightline, supra note 31. 
33. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, SETTING THE STAN-
DARD: INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 5 (Mar. 
1993) (outlining President Clinton's campaign promises with respect to achieving 
uniform workplace standards and proposing various initiatives that should be pursued 
in order to achieve better standards for workers throughout the world). 
34. See The 1992 Campaign: In Dispute; Quayle and Gore Battle Devolves Into 
a Hand-to-Hand Fight About 4 Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at A19 (describing 
the congressional response to the AID program in Central America); David Judson, 
Don't Scrap Foreign Aid, Redesign It, Lawmaker Says, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 
2, 1992 (discussing legislation to reverse the "job exports" strategy in aid to Central 
America). 
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Excessive working hours, like minimum wages, characterize life on 
the "global assembly line" in the developing world. Twelve- to fourteen-
hour days, double shifts, overnight work to meet rush orders, and other 
extended workdays are not uncommon.35 Hazardous job safety and 
health conditions are also common. In Korea, the economic "miracle" 
was financed, at least in part, by ignoring worker safety.34 As noted 
above, violent rank and file reaction to such policies in the late 1980s 
deeply affected trade and investment patterns throughout Asia.37 
3. Labor Rights in Developed Nations 
Discrimination and abuses in the workplace do not occur solely in 
developing nations. They also occur in and have major trade implica-
tions for industrialized nations. In Europe, many employers have object-
ed to "burdensome" employee protections in European labor law, such 
as layoff restrictions and severance pay requirements.33 In turn, major 
European car manufacturers such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz are be-
ginning to erect plants in the United States, citing lower wages and 
weaker unions than the powerful German Metalworkers Federation.39 
35. See Denis MacShane, Dreaming of the Forty-Hour Week, 1989 NATION 658 
(illustrating the excessive working hours faced by laborers in parts of Asia). 
36. See Peter Maass, S. Korea's Economic Miracle Taking Toll Among Workers; 
Job Safety Continues to Be Low Priority, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1989, at El (docu-
menting the current mistreatment of laborers in South Korea). 
37. See OGLE, supra note 14, at 1-26 (explaining that the poor working condi-
tions in South Korea evolved from a legacy of military rule throughout the early and 
middle 1900s, and left the Korean worker with a long, uphill struggle for better wag-
es and conditions once their labor movement was established). 
38. See Patrick Oster, EC's Labor Proposals Are Causing Concern; Changes 
Would Raise Costs for US. Firms, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1991, at C4 (reporting that 
European business owners are wary that, if enacted, the new workplace rules proposed 
by the European Community (EC) Council will result in higher operating costs); see 
also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities: 
What "Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational Employers, 11 
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 564, 594-613 (1991) (outlining the twelve worker rights pro-
posed by the EC Council in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights); 
Roger Cohen, European Fears of Unemployment Will Only Rise; Companies Shift 
Jobs to Escape High Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at Al (hypothesizing that the 
recent increase in unemployment in Europe is due in large part to the changes in 
workplace rules, not as a result of the overall economic depression). 
39. See Doron P. Levin, What BMW Sees in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
11, 1993, at 5 (announcing BMW's decision to open a car assembly plant in South 
Carolina); see also Warren Brown, Mercedes to Build US. Assembly Plant, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 6, 1993, at D3 (reporting that Mercedes will open a plant in the United 
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Additional labor problems exist in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty, 
which set forth an economic integration plan for Europe, has been jeop-
ardized by Great Britain's refusal to accept the "Social Chapter" on 
labor rights and labor standards.40 Upsetting its continental partners, the 
UK is luring enterprises by promising low labor costs and tamed 
unions.41 The controversy promises to continue as the opposition Labor 
Party pledges to adopt the Social Chapter if empowered. Even Mickey 
Mouse cannot evade labor rights issues in trade: the new EuroDisney 
park near Paris ran into protests when Disney — a leader in the United 
States trade surplus in international services and entertainment — im-
posed its personal appearance code on employees who claimed that their 
fundamental rights were violated.42 
In addition to Europe, worker rights in the United States also are 
sharply debated in connection with trade and investment plans. Thou-
sands of employees are illegally fired each year for union activity.43 In 
the United States, the right to strike, treated by most analysts as an 
integral feature of the right of association,44 has been weakened by the 
use of permanent replacements to break strikes.45 One case in particular, 
States for the production of utility vehicles). 
40. See Richard W. Stevenson, Major Is Rebuffed in Parliament in Vote on the 
European Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at Al (explaining the political division 
within the British Parliament in which Prime Minister Major opposed the passage of 
the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty while the opposition Labor Party support-
ed it). 
41. See William Drozdiak, French Say United Europe Promoted 'Job Poaching': 
Shift of Plant to Scotland Sets Off Furor, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1993, at A23 (re-
porting that Scottish workers agreed to waive their right to strike and accepted a 
year-long wage freeze, which has attracted several businesses to the area from other 
European locations). 
42. See Disney Dress Code Chafes in the Land of Haute Couture, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 25, 1991, at 1 (noting the problems that EuroDisney has encountered by enact-
ing detailed rules regarding how its employees may dress and the type of appearance 
such employees must uphold). Not only are the employees complaining that the rules 
violate their rights, but also scholars and critics are claiming that Disney is violating 
the privacy of its French employees by attempting to impose American culture on the 
French. Id. 
43. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep; Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organi-
zation Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (discussing the high level of 
discriminatory discharges for union activity by U.S. employers). 
44. See RUTH BEN-ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: THE CASE OF 
THE FREEDOM TO STRIKE 71-92 (1990) (arguing that labor organizations and the right 
to strike are basic human rights that should be recognized by all nations). 
45. The permanent replacement doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
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when the Caterpillar Corporation broke a United Auto Workers strike in 
1992 by threatening to bring in permanent replacements,45 has important 
implications for a key export industry. The resulting bitterness,47 in 
contrast to what had been an extensive program of labor-management 
cooperation, now jeopardizes Caterpillar's place as a premier exporter of 
heavy construction equipment in its competition with Japanese manufac-
turers. 
Charges of sex, race, and national origin discrimination also mark 
labor relations in developed countries. The place of immigrant laborers 
from Southern Europe and Northern Africa has been sharply debated in 
France, Germany and other Northern European countries. The opening of 
borders in Eastern Europe has brought large-scale migration of workers 
seeking better-paying jobs in the West, and finding painful discrimina-
tion as well.48 Discrimination against Hispanic workers in the United 
States, both undocumented migrants and United States citizens, continues 
to undermine worker rights in this country/9 
As the globalization of economic activity proceeds apace and capital 
goods and services become increasingly mobile, workers and unions are 
pushing for expanded rights and protections on an international scale.50 
In many cases, employers and governments are responding with de-
mands for austerity and concessions.51 The ensuing conflicts complicate 
NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
46. See Kevin Kelly et al , Caterpillar's Don Files: Why He Didn't Blink, Bus. 
WK., Aug. 10, 1992, at 56-57 (citing the UAWs animosity and its belief that it is 
engaged in a "long war"). 
47. Id. 
48. See John Darnton, Western Europe Is Ending Its Welcome to Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES Aug. 10, 1993, at Al, A6 (describing restrictions and discrimination against immi-
grants seeking refuge in Western Europe). 
49. See L.A. COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR, AFL-CIO, THE IMPACT OF THE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT ON ORGANIZED LABOR IN Los ANGELES 
18-19 (1992) [hereinafter L.A. LABOR] (discussing the extent of discrimination against 
imrnigrant workers and the effects of discrimination on the ability of unions to orga-
nize and bargain for such workers); IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT MONITORING 
PROJECT, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, SEALING OUR BORDERS: THE 
HUMAN TOLL 14-15 (1992) [hereinafter THE HUMAN TOLL] (stating that discrimination 
by employees against Hispanics and Asian immigrants divides and weakens unions). 
50. See Don J. Pease, New Tliinking in East-West Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, April 20, 1989, at 18 (noting that recognition of economic rights of workers 
may be a harbinger of future international policy making). 
51. See Ben Parfitt Vansun, Mill Closures Will Idle More Tlxan 500 Staff, VAN-
COUVER SUN, Sept 4, 1991, at Dl (stating that as a result of higher costs, a Canadi-
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trade policy and development strategies, and challenge traditional pat-
terns of sovereignty in establishing labor rights and labor standards 
within national borders. 
Having established a framework focusing on the growing importance 
of labor rights in international trade, this Article now addresses two con-
crete cases of international labor rights advocacy. The cases show a 
variety of ways in which the issues arise and are dealt with by unions, 
employers, governments, and NGOs. 
n. CASE STUDIES 
This Article examines two current case studies to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of private actors challenging traditional notions of sovereignty 
with respect to worker rights in the transnational economy. The first 
study looks at the role of trade unions and allied human rights organiza-
tions in the struggle over NAFTA. The second examines labor rights 
advocacy in the United States on behalf of workers and unions in Gua-
temala. Although the elements, strategies, and tactics of the non-gov-
ernmental actors differ, they still share the same effect of raising labor 
rights and labor standards from a purely domestic to an international 
level. 
A. PRIVATE ACTORS AND NAFTA 
1. Contributions and Actions of Private Actors 
The U.S. House of Representatives approved the North American Free 
Trade Agreement on November 17, 1993.52 The Senate gave its approv-
al on November 20, 1993.53 The congressional voting culminated an 
arduous legislative battle marked by splits among Democratic Party 
leaders,54 and Republican and Democratic Party activists.33 In addition, 
an company is seeking concessions in areas of seniority and scheduling). 
52. See Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves U.S.-Canada-Mexico Trade Pact on 234 
to 200 Vote, Giving Clinton Big Victory; NAFTA Split Parties, Shuffled Politics As Admin-
istration Overtook Opponents, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al (recounting Clinton's 
victory in winning House approval of NAFTA). 
53. See Helen Dewar, NAFTA Wins Final Congressional Test, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 
1993, at Al (reporting Senate approval of NAFTA by a 61 to 38 vote). 
54. See Robin Toner, Congressional Leaders: Divided Sentiments, Divided Loyalties, 
N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 16, 1993, at BIO (describing politicking in Congress prior to the 
NAFTA vote). 
55. See Dan Balz, NAFTA Forces Each Party to Face Internal Divisions, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at A8 (explaining differences of opinion on NAFTA within political 
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unusual pro- and anti-NAFTA coalitions formed,55 which resulted in 
Clinton Administration "trading" for pro-NAFTA votes.57 The NAFTA 
vote also exposed conflict between the Democratic Administration and 
two of its chief constituencies, the organized labor movement'5 and an 
important faction of the environmental movement." 
International labor rights and other social standards became pivotal 
issues in the debate over NAFTA.60 These issues became critical in part 
due to the breadth of the coalitions formed in the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico to oppose NAFTA,61 and in part due to the barbed treat-
ment of the agreement by Ross Perot, who evoked "the great sucking 
sound" of jobs going South in televised presidential debates and in a 
parties). 
56. See David E. Rosenbaum, Splintered on Trade: 2 Unusual Political Alliances 
Reflect Long-Term Gain and Short-Term Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,1993, at B12 (noting 
"scrambled politics" surrounding the NAFTA debate in the United States). 
57. See Michael Wines, A 'Bazaar' Method of Dealing for Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 1993, at A23 (discussing "retail politics" involved in assuring NAFTA votes); Kevin 
Merida & Tom Kenworthy, For Some, a Bitter NAFTA Taste: House Awaits Fallout from 
Bipartisan Vote Deal-Making, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al (describing "logrolling* 
and "deals President Clinton cut" assuring special treatment for sugar, citrus, vegetable, 
beef, peanuts, appliances and other products to secure lawmakers' votes for NAFTA). 
58. See Peter T. Kilbom, Unions Gird for War Over Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4. 
1993, at A14 (reporting that unions sought to rum NAFTA into a single issue debate over 
labor rights); Thomas K. Friedman, Adamant Unions Zero In on Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
16,1993, at BIO (discussing union leaders* grave concerns with NAFTA). 
59. See Keith Schneider, Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free-Trade 
Pact, N.Y. HMES, Sept 16, 1993, at Al (discussing rift within environmental community 
over NAFTA). 
60. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Vague Mexico Wage Pledge Clouds Free Trade Ac-
cord, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 29, 1993, at Al (focusing on minimum wage concerns of 
NAFTA); Anthony DePalma, Painful Lessons for Mexican Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
1993, at 39 (discussing Volkswagen's lockout as a precursor to Mexican labor problems 
after NAFTA); Tim Golden, A History of Pollution in Mexico Casts Clouds Over Trade 
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al (reporting efforts in Mexico City to address 
Mexican environmental concerns). 
6 1 . See generally INSTITUTE FOR POUCY STUDIES AND ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE 
TRADE, NAFTA RESOURCES (1993) (providing a substantial list of anti-NAFTA coalition 
participants and resources). The principal United States coalition with respect to labor, 
trade, and development concerns is the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART), coordinated 
in Washington, D.C. by the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund 
(ILRERF). The Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC), also based in Washington, D.C, focuses 
on environmental and consumer affairs in connection with NAFTA. Canada's major coali-
tion is the Action Canada Network, based in Ottawa; Mexico's major coalition is the Na-
tional Action Network on Free Trade, based in Mexico City. 
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later debate with Vice President Al Gore.62 The alleged lack of ade-
quate labor protections became a focal point of opposition to NAFTA,63 
along with news of Mexican efforts to lure deliberately businesses from 
the United States,64 by revelations that claims of net gains in United 
States employment under NAFTA are exaggerated,65 by continuing evi-
dence that Mexico's political and judicial systems are rife with corrup-
tion,66 and by reports that United States companies operating in Mexico 
are among the worst violators of labor rights.67 
United States NGOs have long been active on issues of labor rights 
and working conditions, particularly in the maquiladora factory zones 
along the United States-Mexico border. United States-based companies 
own hundreds of maquiladora plants and employ approximately half a 
million Mexican workers.68 Concerns about pollution, unsafe working 
62. The '92 Vote: The 2nd Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 15, 
1992); The '92 Vote: The 3rd Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 
1992); Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993). 
63. See Lane Kirkland, A Backward-Looking Deal: The Pact Is Full of Safeguards for 
Property Rights, but None for Workers' Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A25 
(criticizing NAFTA for failing to account for critical labor issues in the United States and 
Mexico). 
64. See Tim Golden, Who's Stealing Jobs From Whom? Mexico Is Finding Free 
Trade Has Political Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at E5 (finding that entre-
preneurs had established an investment fund to buy American companies and move 
them to Mexico). 
65. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Job Gains Discounted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 22, 
1993, at Dl (analyzing reports that claims of job gains for the United States under 
NAFTA do not hold up beyond 1995, and concluding that in the long term the Unit-
ed States will lose jobs). 
66. See Enrique Rice et al., 'Trick or Trade?'; For Most Mexicans, This Treaty 
Only Props Up One-Party Rule, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1993, at C3 (arguing that 
reform in Mexico's civil liberties, political process, and labor rights are needed before 
approving the free trade agreement); Tim Golden, Mexican Leader Asks Executives To 
Give Party $25 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al (stating that the 
contributions may have been improper and that such contributions are unregulated in 
Mexico); Tod Robberson, In Mexico, System Turns Cops Into Robbers, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 12, 1993, at Al (reporting that bribery and theft is a way of life for Mexico 
City police officers due to the corruption of their "bosses"). 
67. See Anthony DePalma, Report on Trade Treaty Is Critical of Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 1993, at D2 (discussing reports that "major American companies that are 
staunch supporters of the North American Free Trade Agreement [have] . . . consistently 
violated workers* rights"). 
68. See Larry Weiss, The Wealthy, Not Workers, Stand to Gain from Trade Pact, 
STAR TRIB., May 16, 1992, at 17A (noting that of the half-million Mexican workers 
employed by U.S. companies, seventy percent are women). 
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conditions, and poverty-level wages have motivated the AFL-CIO and a 
coalition of religious and environmental groups to issue a code of con-
duct for United States companies in the maquiladora region.® 
The MAQUILADORA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (Code) seeks to pro-
mote a safe environment, safe workplaces, and an adequate standard of 
living for workers.70 The Code addresses hazardous waste disposal, 
chemical leaks, and transportation of toxic materials. The Code farther 
requires disclosure to workers and communities on the use and risks of 
chemicals and other hazardous materials; suggests mandatory workplace 
safety and health committees with training for worker members; seeks to 
protect the right to organize and ban discrimination, including sexual ha-
rassment; and calls for fair wages, hours, and working conditions.71 The 
Code also would abolish barracks-style living quarters for workers, and 
establish a trust fund to improve housing, health care, sanitary services, 
and other infrastructure.72 
In addition to NGOs, some organizations, such as the United Electri-
cal Workers (UE), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
(ELGWU), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers (ACTWU), 
and other trade unions active in organizing among Mexican-American 
workers in Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas have 
created joint movements with independent Mexican unionists to support 
organizing in the maquiladora factories.73 Women's organizations and 
environmental groups have forged similar movements.74 
Researchers in the legal field contributed analyses of labor laws and 
how they would affect the new trade agreement,73 including a detailed 
69. THE CORPORATE EXAMINER, INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSI-
BILITY, MAQUILADORA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (1991). 
70. Id 
71. Id at 3-5. 
72. Id at 5. 
73. See, e.g., UNITED ELECTOICAL WORKERS, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF 
AMERICA AND F t e m AUTENTICO DEL TRABAJO STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL ALLI-
ANCE, STATEMENT OF JOINT WORK (1991) (stating their intention to collaborate in 
organizing unions in maquiladora zone electronics plants), 
74. See EQUAL MEANS, WHY IS FREE TRADE A WOMEN'S ISSUE? (1991) (noting 
the strides made by women in this movement); NATIONAL TOXIC CAMPAIGN FUND, 
BORDER TROUBLE: RIVERS IN PERIL (1991) (illustrating the environmental groups 
positions and actions); see generally TEXAS CENTER FOR POUCY STUDIES, NAFTA 
AND THE UNITED STATES/MEXICO BORDER ENVIRONMENT: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESSIO-
NAL ACTION (1992) (listing the organizations involved in creating the NAFTA docu-
ment). 
75. See, e.g., Ann M. Bartow, Comment, The Rights of Workers in Mexico 11 
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study of women workers in the maquiladora™ Private sector activism 
on NAFTA culminated in a comprehensive Citizens* Analysis of 
NAFTA, released in December 1992.77 At the same time, the Mexican 
Action Network published "Our Evaluation on the Formal Negotiations 
of the Free Trade Agreement," and the Canadian Center for Policy Al-
ternatives issued its "Which Way for the Americas: Analysis of NAFTA 
Proposals and the Impact on Canada."78 
COMP. LAB. LJ. 182 (1990) (describing Mexico's Labor Code); Amy H. Goldin, 
Comment, Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of Democracy in 
Trade Unions, 11 COMP. LAB. LJ. 203 (1990) (criticizing elements of Mexican labor 
law and practice); Susanna Peters, Comment, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: 
Choosing Between Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 COMP. LAB. LJ. 226 
(1990) (analyzing labor abuses in the maquiladora zone); Michael S. Barr et al., 
Comment, Labor and Environmental Rights in the Proposed Mexico-United States 
Free Trade Agreement, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) (analyzing Mexican labor law, 
comparing labor clauses in the European Community Social Charter, and proposing a 
dispute-settlement mechanism for labor issues). 
76. See Frances Lee Ansley, U.S. Mexico Trade from the Bottom: A Postcard 
from the Border, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (1992) (describing the reaction of 
American women factory workers, who had lost their jobs when their factories relo-
cated to the maquiladora region, at their meeting with the Mexican women v/ho 
worked in the new Mexican factory zone). A University of Tennessee professor orga-
nized a delegation of women who lost their jobs to the maquiladora region to tour 
the Mexican factory zone and meet with the women workers there. Id. In addition to 
the written report, the nationwide public television program NOVA aired footage show-
ing working conditions in the maquiladora and their effect on United States and 
Mexican women workers. Frances Lee Ansley, North American Free Trade Agree* 
ment: The Public Debate, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329, 332 n.8 (1993) (noting 
filming of visits with women workers in the border region, aired by Public Broadcast-
ing System on May 26 and 27, 1992). 
77. See JOHN AUDLEY ET AL., U.S. CITIZENS' ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMEmfpage] (1992) [hereinafter CITIZENS' ANALYSIS] (address-
ing labor rights, working conditions, employment and income, environment, agriculture, 
energy, economic development, consumer affairs, health and safety, dispute resolution 
and enforcement, human rights and democracy, and other NAFTA-related issues). 
Representatives of the following organizations coordinated the NAFTA analysis: the 
Sierra Club, United Auto Workers, Fair Trade Campaign, Institute for Policy Studies, 
National Lawyers Guild, Greenpeace USA, The Development Group for Alternative 
Policies, International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, Economic Policy 
Institute, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and Public Citizen, and contained 
contributing materials from dozens of other citizens groups. Id. 
78. See supra note 61- (describing NAFTA-related coalitions). 
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2. The Labor Agreement 
During his successful campaign for the presidency, then-Governor Bill 
Clinton insisted that final approval of the NAFTA depended on further 
negotiation -of a parallel agreement with Canada and Mexico on labor 
rights and labor standards.79 Labor advocates opposed the side agree-
ment that emerged, especially for its failure to include rights of associa-
tion, organizing, and bargaining in the scope of independent review and 
enforcement mechanisms in the side agreement*3 
The NAFTA labor side agreement simultaneously preserves and 
breaches traditional sovereignty in labor matters. The side agreement 
affirms "the right of each Party [the United States, Canada, and Mexico] 
to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify 
accordingly its labor laws and regulations."81 
At the same time, the labor side agreement subjects eight areas of 
labor standards to the tripartite oversight system set up in the agree-
ment.82 In addition, three of the eight areas come under the dispute 
settlement and enforcement provision of the side agreement that could 
result in fines of up to $20 million83 or a suspension of NAFTA trade 
benefits84 against a country that has a "persistent pattern of failure . . . 
to effectively enforce its occupational safety and health, child labor or 
minimum wage technical labor standards."85 
79. See Gwen Ifil, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats; With Reservation, 
Clinton Endorses Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 5 1992, at Al (discussing then-
Governor Clinton's stance on NAFTA's labor issues). 
80. See JEROME I. LEVINSON, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE LABOR SIDE 
ACCORD TO THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: AN ENDORSEMENT OF 
THE ABUSE OF WORKER RIGHTS IN MEXICO (1993) (stating the numerous possible 
flaws in the trade agreement and its negative effect on labor rights). 
81. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the Government 
of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United Mexican States, Sept 13, 1993, art 2 [hereinafter Labor Side Agreement] (finaliz-
ing labor issues among the NAFTA parties). 
82. The eight areas are: 1) forced labor, 2) child labor, 3) minimum wage and over-
time pay; 4) employment discrimination; 5) equal pay for men and women; 6) occupational 
safety and health; 7) workers* compensation; and 8) protection of migrant workers. See id. 
art 41 (defining "technical labor standards"). Section B, art 23 of the Labor Side Agree-
ment subjects "technical labor standards" to reporting by an Evaluation Committee of 
Experts. Id. section B, art 23. 
83. Id. art 39(4)(b) and Annex 39. 
84. Id art 41. 
85. Id art 29(1). 
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The NAFTA labor side agreement fails to establish international stan-
dards that can be enforced under the agreement; to that extent, sover-
eignty in setting domestic labor standards is maintained. The agreement 
does permit, however, international oversight, and a measure of enforce-
ment, over each country's administration of its own labor laws. This 
"half a loaf disappoints advocates of binding international labor stan-
dards,86 but sets the stage for continuing efforts to establish labor stan-
dards in international trade both in future changes in NAFTA, and in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.87 
Future debates over NAFTA will continue to address such questions. 
Should countries limit themselves to a uniform set of minimum labor 
standards to be enforced separately by each government, or to a supra-
national enforcement regime like that envisioned for the trade rules 
under NAFTA?88 Will a lowest-common-denominator of the three 
country's labor laws serve as the basis for continental standards, or will 
the labor rights clauses of United Nations human rights instruments and 
human rights conventions of the ELO serve as the starting point, as 
recommended by labor rights advocates?89 How will the disparity in 
levels of development between two advanced industrial powers and a 
Third World country be reconciled in matters of child labor or minimum 
wage requirements?90 What standing will private parties — individual 
workers, trade unions, human rights organizations, and other private 
advocates — have to invoke labor rights protection under a NAFTA 
labor rights agreement?91 Will state and provincial laws be preempted 
86. See LEVINSON, supra note 80. 
87. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD 
ECONOMY 335-56 (1992) (discussing efforts to include labor and environmental standards 
in the GATT). 
88. See Ban*, supra note 75, at 47-49 (analyzing the structure of the European 
Community institutions as a possible model for enforcing policy options of NAFTA); 
see also CITIZENS' ANALYSIS, supra note 77, at 46-50 (discussing NAFTA dispute 
resolution provisions that alarm labor and environmental groups). 
89. See CITIZENS' ANALYSIS, supra note 77, at 27-28 (showing how United Na-
tions standards have obtained sufficient consensus to be adopted as standards to be 
included in NAFTA); Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and Instruments of 
Recourse for Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151 (1992) (noting that the spe-
cialized United Nations body called the International Labour Organisation is the pri-
mary forum for presenting international labor rights claims). 
90. See Rothstein, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing the issue of standardized wages 
internationally). 
91. See Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Econo-
my: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. REV. 31 (1981) (noting the lack of 
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or permitted to stand undisturbed in the federal system of each coun-
try?92 
Whatever the answers to these and other issues involving labor rights 
and labor standards in North America, they pose direct challenges to 
traditional principles of sovereignty in domestic economic and develop-
ment policies.93 Taken as a whole, action by private labor rights advo-
cates has opened up opportunities for new roles and new influence by 
workers and trade unions in the transnational economy of North Ameri-
ca.94 
B. UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALAN LABOR RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
Over the past four decades, suppression of organized labor has been a 
consistent feature of both open military rule and military-controlled 
civilian governments in Guatemala.95 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, United States labor rights advocates targeted Guatemala's re-
cord through a systematic movement to expose worker rights violations 
and created new models for labor rights advocacy.95 As with labor 
rights issues in NAFTA, these efforts initially seemed fruitless, if not 
regulatory protections for workers in developing countries). 
92. See CrnZENS' ANALYSIS, supra note 77, at 51 (discussing how federal pre-
emption of state law becomes problematic in the application of international 
agreement); see generally John Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: 
A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992) (concluding that national legal 
systems must take international institutions and treaty-making processes into account in 
order to preserve the validity of legal domestic application in addition to incorporating 
international legal norms). 
93. See Theresa A. Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade 
Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990) (discuss-
ing the goal of human rights advocates to create viable international mechanisms for 
the protection of labor rights). 
94. See id. at 80 (noting that both governmental and NGOs are seeking to ad-
vance human rights via policy decisions); but see id. at 109 (discussing how a private 
party may be ineffective in gathering information due to possible inaccessibility to a 
particular country). 
95. See JAMES A. GOLDSTON, SHATTERED HOPE: GUATEMALAN WORKERS AND 
THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 5-9 (1989) (discussing the history of the repression of 
labor unions in Guatemala). 
96. See International Commission for Central American Development and Recov-
ery, POVERTY, CONFLICT AND HOPE: A TURNING POINT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, Feb. 
15, 1989 (press conference) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (discussing 
how Commission members met with government officials and were able to create 
town meetings in certain countries, bringing together representatives of the govern-
ment, private sector, labor, and church). 
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futile. Their innovative use of different forums in the United States for 
raising international labor rights claims on behalf of Guatemalans ex-
ploited the fissures in traditional doctrines of absolute sovereignty in 
labor relations matters, fissures that appeared under the pressure of glob-
al economic integration.97 
1. Background 
A decade of blossoming for Guatemalan trade unions and popular 
organizations in the decade following the Second World War ended with 
a military takeover in 1954 sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) that eliminated the elected government.98 Prior to the 
coup, one-fourth of the Guatemalan workforce belonged to the unions.99 
The majority of these workers were in stable, regular employment set-
tings with minimum wage and social insurance legislation designed to 
protect employees.100 For the past four decades, however, the military 
rule and military-controlled civilian governments in Guatemala have 
consistently suppressed organized labor.101 Enforcement of protective 
legislation languished as the wealthy land- and business-owning class, 
backed by the military, reasserted control over the country, its resources, 
and its workers.102 
97. See AFL-CIO Report on Worker Rights Violations Abroad Submitted to Office 
of U.S. Trade Representative, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (July 2, 1987), available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing how the AFL-CIO alerted the United 
States Trade Representative of the failure of Guatemala to abide by internationally 
recognized standards of worker rights based on the Generalized System of Preferenc-
es); Excerpts From Speech of Administration Policy Toward Latin America, NOTlSUR-
LATIN AM. POL. AFP., May 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File 
(reiterating the Clinton Administration's promotion and protection of human rights 
goals within the framework of a labor rights agenda). 
98. See STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 28 (1982) (detailing Guatemala's history after the 
1954 United States-backed coup); JAMES HANDY, GIFT OF THE DEVIL: HISTORY OF 
GUATEMALA (1984) (tracing the troubled political history of Guatemala from colonial 
times to the present). 
99. See HANDY, supra note 98, at 124-25 (explaining the increase in tolerance 
and numbers of unions prior to the coup of 1954); GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 7 
(noting that 536 unions were registered with the Guatemalan Government at the time 
of the coup in 1954). 
100. GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 6. 
101. See HANDY, supra note 98, at 5-9 (discussing Guatemala's repression of labor 
unions). 
102. See Goldston, supra note 95, at 147-54 (discussing the failure of labor law 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a brutal military campaign against 
a small guerilla movement resulted in massive human rights violations 
that were predominantly targeted against the indigenous peoples of the 
highlands.103 Estimates of the persons killed by the army or "disappear-
ances"- exceeded 100,0Q0.IM In 1980, the police kidnapped seventeen 
members of the executive board of the national trade union federation 
who were never seen again.105 Dozens of individual union leaders were 
assassinated, and many went into exile due to death threats.106 
International concern and revulsion towards these practices in Guate-
mala led to the inauguration of a nominally civilian government in 
1986.107 With the advent of the Christian Democratic government of 
Vinicio Cerezo came a new constitution that guaranteed the rights of 
workers to organize and bargain.103 Guatemalan labor activists respond-
ed by increasing activity, forming new unions, and seeking to bargain 
with employers.109 But physical assaults, threats, relaxed enforcement of 
labor laws, a hostile judiciary, and continued employer resistance to 
unions frustrated and wore down many labor activists.110 Trade union-
ists continue to face accusations of links to the guerilla movement as 
businesses employ tactics to frighten unionists and their co-workers to 
abandon union organizing.111 
enforcement to protect "a substantially illiterate working population, scarred by years 
of organized terror"). 
103. See AMERICAS WATCH, GUATEMALA:, A NATION OF PRISONERS 104 (1984) 
(documenting the history and recent resurgence of human rights abuses in Guatemala 
with emphasis on the developments following the coup of August 1983, when General 
Mejia Victores seized power). 
104. See id at 16 (tabulating massive numbers of flagrant killings and disappear-
ances); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA; INVESTIGATIONS INTO DISAP-
PEARANCES: THE INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION (1987) (reporting on Guatemalan disap-
pearances); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA TRADE UNIONISTS AND POLTTICAL 
ACTIVISTS TARGETED UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT (1991) (addressing trade union-
ists as targets in Guatemala); and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA IMPUNITY: 
A QUESTION OF POLITICAL WILL (1993) [hereinafter GUATEMALA IMPUNITY] (docu-
menting the continued of human rights abuses of workers and other civilians). 
105. GUATEMALA IMPUNITY, supra note 104. 
106. GUATEMALA IMPUNITY, supra note 104. 
107. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (noting that the civilian government in-
stituted in 1986 tolerates dissent). 
108. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (discussing how the Christian Democrat-
ic Government is credited by most union leaders as easing constraints on unionizing). 
109. Goldston, supra note 95, at 11. 
110. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (noting that union participants continue 
to be persecuted, albeit to a lesser extent). 
111. See GOLDSTON, supra, note 95, at 12 (discussing how many businesses in 
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In the 1990 elections, conservative businessman Jorge Serrano ousted 
the Christian Democratic administration and rose to the presidency in 
January 1991."2 Serrano campaigned on promises of economic devel-
opment, especially in the maquila sector of factories that exported appar-
el and electronics goods, predominantly to the United States.113 A pro-
gram that began in the mid-1980s with just six factories employing 
fewer than 2,000 workers grew to more than 275 factories and 50,000 
employees by 1992.114 Fierce employer opposition to union organizing, 
massive minimum wage and hour law violations, hazardous working 
conditions, and use of child labor characterized the industrial relations in 
this sector.115 
2. Using the Labor Rights Clause of the GSP 
United States labor rights advocates employed the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) as a means of addressing worker rights violations 
in Guatemala.116 A 1986-87 General Review conducted by the United 
States Trade Representative yielded no actionable basis in Guatemala.117 
The International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund and allied 
United States union, church, and human rights groups filed petitions 
every year to the United States Trade Representative calling for 
Guatemala's removal as a GSP beneficiary country unless it consistently 
respected labor rights.118 
In connection with each petition, the United States coalition sent a 
Guatemala view unions as being part of the government's overall plan to destroy the 
private sector); see also Petition to the United States Trade Representative: Labor 
Rights in Guatemala (USTR 1989); Petition and Request for Review of the GSP Sta-
tus of Guatemala (USTR 1990); Petition and Request for Review of the GSP Status 
of Guatemala (USTR 1991); and Petition/Request for Review of the GSP Status of 
Guatemala (USTR 1992) [hereinafter GSP Petitions] (discussing Guatemala's troubled 
worker rights history and status with respect to the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP)). 
112. See KURT PETERSEN, THE MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA 3 
(1992) (discussing the 1991 election of Jorge Serrano). 
113. Id. 
114. Id at 32-33. 
115. Id. at 3-4. 
116. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988) (stating statutory rubric that United States 
follows with regard to Guatemala and the GSP). 
117. GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 156-57. 
118. See GSP Petitions, supra note 111 (emphasizing the prevalence of flagrant 
human rights abuses in Guatemala). 
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delegation to meet with workers, union leaders, church leaders, United 
States embassy officers, and Guatemalan government officials (including, 
in 1988, then-President Vinicio Cerezo).119 United States delegations 
met with factory owners and plantation managers, with officials of the 
Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, and with the heads of the maquila 
sector promotional group.120 The labor rights delegation gathered infor-
mation for its petition, and pressed for improved protection of worker 
rights.121 Similarly, invited by their United States counterparts, Guate-
malan unionists sent delegations to the United States to meet with labor, 
church, human rights, community organizations, as well as United States 
Government officials to discuss labor rights and labor conditions in their 
country.122 
Although the first four GSP petitions filed by United States labor 
rights advocates from 1988 to 1991 carefully detailed assassinations, 
arrests and torture of trade union activists, repressive provisions of the 
Guatemalan Labor Code, and non-enforcement of worker protection 
laws, the interagency committee that considers GSP worker rights peti-
tions failed to accept the petitions for review. Despite this failure, the 
cycle of delegations, petitions, and rejections created a dynamic of in-
creasing pressure on the Guatemalan government and employers to avert 
trade sanctions for worker rights violations.123 Allowing the Guatemalan 
119. See Labor Groups Say Tlxey Will Ask USTR to Deny GSP Benefits to Guate-
mala, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (May 20, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
OMNI File (discussing the actions of labor groups following a week-long visit to 
Guatemala). 
120. See Trish O'Kane, Vice President Moves to Take Power in Guatemala, S£. 
CHRON., June 3, 1993, at A8 (discussing how Chamber of Commerce leaders feared 
greatly the loss of United States trade benefits under the GSP equaling approximately 
$160 million per year in tariff-free Guatemalan exports); see also Charges Fly at 
Guatemala Trade Hearings; Labor Conditions Disputed at U.S. Government Hearings 
on Revoking Guatemala's Generalized System of Preference Trade Status, VAVD Capi-
tal Cities Media, Oct 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File [here-
inafter Guatemala Charges] (noting that Pharis Harvey, a member of the International 
Labor Rights and Education Research Fund, testified that violence and worker abuse 
mark Guatemala's maquila sector). 
121. See Guatemala Charges, supra note 120, at 30 (discussing the actions of 
such United States labor groups as the AFL-CIO and the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union, who pressed for United States and Guatemalan Government involve-
ment to correct current problems). 
122. Guatemala Cliarges, supra note 120, at 30. 
123. See O'Kane, supra note 120, at A8 (emphasizing the importance of GSP 
trade benefits to Guatemala). 
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Government to recognize such pressure allowed the Government to 
claim that it was "taking steps" under the GSP to afford labor rights 
without making substantive changes.124 
The exchange of petitions and rejections in 1988 to 1991 also created 
embarrassment for the United States Government, which found itself 
having to devise increasingly contorted arguments to justify a refusal to 
accept these petitions for review.125 Year after year, the Trade Policy 
Staff Committee (TPSC) pointed to the introduction of a labor code 
reform bill in the Guatemalan Congress as evidence of "steps" toward 
worker rights enhancement, despite the fact that each year the reform 
bill failed to pass and all parties acknowledged that it had no chance to 
pass.126 
In 1992, the persistent efforts of United States labor rights advocates 
who pursued the GSP strategy proved fruitful.127 Following the submis-
sion of a new labor rights petition in June 1992, the Labor Rights Fund 
and related union, church, and human rights groups organized letter-
writing campaigns among their grass roots members to the USTR urging 
acceptance of the petition for further review in public hearings.128 At 
the urging of petitioners, over one hundred members of the United 
124. See O'Kane, supra note 120, at A8 (noting how, in one Guatemalan analyst's 
opinion, meetings and negotiations that are beginning to take place between the 
Chamber of Commerce, political parties and the popular movement in Guatemala are 
only for the sake of appearances); see also PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 181 (dis-
cussing the requirement under the GSP that a country be "taking steps" toward work-
er rights to maintain beneficial tariff treatment). 
125. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 157 (discussing how the decision to reject 
the petitions violated the spirit of the law by not allowing information to flow to the 
U.S. Trade Representative as Congress intended). Furthermore, the refusal to review 
the petition allowed for GSP trade benefits to remain intact in the face of violations 
of labor rights, which clearly violated the statute. Id. 
126. See, e.g., 1990 GSP Annual Review; Workers' Rights Review Summary; Peti~ 
tions Not Accepted for Review (USTR 1990) (asserting that "the Government of Gua-
temala is actively pushing the passage of the code"). 
127. USTR Accepts 20 Petitions in 1992 Annual GSP Review, Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (denoting that 
the USTR accepted the GSP petition for 1992 to determine whether to suspend 
Guatemala's GSP benefits). 
128. See Letter from Stephen Coats, Executive Director, U.SVGuatemala Labor 
Education Project, to Mickey Kantor, USTR (Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Letter to 
USTR] (on file with the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund) 
(urging the USTR to extend the review by six months in order to assess adequately 
whether the GSP benefits for Guatemala should be suspended based upon evidence 
that efforts to improve labor rights have been demonstrative and not substantive). 
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States Congress responded by writing to the USTR calling for accep-
tance and review.129 
Like its predecessors, the 1992 GSP labor rights petition cited contin-
ued attacks and threats against trade unionists, labor code provisions that 
run afoul of International Labour Organisation Conventions, non-enforce-
ment of minimum wage and hour laws, widespread child labor abuses, 
and life-threatening health and safety hazards.130 Much of the petition 
focused on conditions in the burgeoning maquila sector, with special 
attention given to the large number of Korean-owned apparel manufac-
turing factories.131 Evidence assembled by petitioners reflected massive 
minimum wage violations, use of child labor, health and safety hazards, 
and illegal crushing of efforts by workers to form unions.132 
The GSP petition created an uproar in Guatemala, shattering expecta-
tions that it would be treated, as in previous years, by being sloughed 
off with a few minor "steps" toward labor rights. Employers, govern-
ment spokespersons, and the press complained of United States interfer-
ence in the sovereign affairs of Guatemala, and warned of dire economic 
consequences if the United States sought to apply labor rights sanc-
tions.133 Guatemalan union leaders who had cooperated with United 
129. See Letter from Members of Congress to Ambassador Carla Hills (July 30, 
1992) (on file with the ILRERF, Washington, D.C.) (requesting the USTR to review 
the petition on labor rights in Guatemala). 
130. See GSP Petitions, supra note 111 (noting that the 1992 petition was filed 
by the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), the United 
States/Guatemala Labor Education Project (U.S./GLEP), the United Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Work-
ers Union (ACTWU), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ELGWU), the 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the International Union of Food and 
Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), the International Union of Electronics Workers 
(IUE), the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the National Council 
of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Human Rights Office). 
131. See PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 137 (noting that fifty of the largest 
maquila sector factories are owned by Korean investors). Promoters of export-led 
development in Guatemala held out the Korean "economic miracle" of the 1970s and 
1980s as a model for Guatemala. Id. 
132. See Petition/Request for Review of the GSP Status of Guatemala Under GSP 
Worker Rights Provisions 20-23, 26-28, 31-35 (June 2, 1992) (citing examples of 
labor violations in Guatemala). 
133. See Boicot al Gobierno o a los Guatemaltecos? [Boycotting the Government 
or the Guatemalans?] EL GRAHCO (Guatemala City), June 16, 1992, at 8 (stating that 
"Eso es lo absurdo de los norteamericanos cuando meten sits narices en los asuntos 
internos de otros pueblos . . . . Si hay un pueblo que ha sido a lo largo de su 
historia violador de los derechos humanos, ha sido los Estados Unidos.) [This is the 
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States labor rights delegations and had come to Washington to testify at 
the GSP hearing received renewed death threats.134 
Despite such fiilminations, Guatemala was anxious to avoid sanctions. 
The government and employers moved quickly, settling a number of 
longstanding labor disputes and amending the labor code with provisions 
sought over time by trade unions.135 Included in the reform was a sim-
plification of union organization and strengthening of enforcement mea-
sure for violators.136 
There were three possible results from the petition/hearing process 
under the GSP labor rights clause. The first view determined that Guate-
mala was "taking steps" to afford internationally recognized worker 
rights, and thus would be entitled to remain in the GSP program.137 In 
contrast, if Guatemala were not taking steps, it would be removed from 
GSP beneficiary status.138 Lastly, Guatemala could be "pended," or 
placed on "continuing review" status.139 In this last scenario, Guatemala 
would remain in the GSP program, but the United States would closely 
monitor it to ensure that Guatemala makes improvements in labor rights 
and working conditions.140 If Guatemala failed to make such improve-
ments, the United States would apply sanctions.141 
Although there was progress in specific labor disputes, unions whose 
applications for legal recognition had been delayed for months were 
finding themselves quickly certified and permitted to function. Some 
absurdity of the Americans, who stick their noses into the internal affairs of other 
countries . . . . If there is one country that has been throughout its history a violator 
of human rights, it has been the United States]. 
134. See Jared Kotler, Keep the Economic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders* MIAMI 
HERALD (int'l ed.), June 7, 1993 at 11A (claiming threats against union leaders). 
135. See United States Department of State, Cable from United States Embassy in 
Guatemala, Labor Code Amendments: Review and Analysis (Dec. 22, 1992) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with ILRERF) (listing changes in the labor code). 
136. See id. (stating that reforms have clarified the union organization process and 
increased penalties for violators); see also Guatemala: Labor Code Meets First Test, 
BULL. DEPT. INT'L APR, AFL-CIO, Feb. 1993, at 5 (reporting a case which tested 
positively the effectiveness of the stronger enforcement of the new labor code). 
137. See Kantor Underscores Workers Rights in announcing 1992 GSP Results, 
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 28, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI 
File (discussing requirements of GSP status). 
138. Id. 
139. See Nicholas Petche, Guatemala City, UPI, Mar. 28, 1993, § Domestic News 
(discussing review options for the U.S. Government under the GSP). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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difficult collective bargaining conflicts were settled with reasonable 
compromises and finally, labor code reforms were enacted.142 Insisting 
on strict, immediate application of the trade sanctions against Guatemala 
posed a danger to the lives of those trade unionists closely allied with 
United States petitioners."3 In March 1993, petitioners and Guatemalan 
unionists jointly called for a six month "continuing review" in the forth-
coming announcement by USTR of the decision on Guatemala,144 dated 
April 1, 1993. For unrelated reasons, the USTR delayed the announce-
ment of the GSP labor rights decisions. This delay, coupled with the 
subsequent dramatic turn of events in Guatemala, made the GSP labor 
rights petition a pivotal issue affecting the fate of constitutional order in 
Guatemala.145 
On May 25, 1993, President Jorge Serrano dissolved the Guatemalan 
Congress and Supreme Court and suspended constitutional rights.145 He 
made charges of corruption in Congress and warned against 
"destabilizing" demonstration activity by trade unionists and popular 
organizations.147 The Guatemalan military initially announced support 
for the auto-golpe (self-coup) and Serrano.143 Union leaders, 
farmworkers, and community activists took extraordinary security mea-
sures, fearing a return to mass arrests or worse atrocities.14^ 
The Serrano self-coup only lasted one week, as domestic and interna-
142. Fabiana Frayssinet, Guatemala: Workers Trapped in a Legal Labyrinth, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE, Oct 19, 1992. 
143. See Jared Kotler, Keep the Economic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders, MIAMI 
HERALD (int'l ed.), June 7, 1993, at 11A (discussing threats to workers). 
144. See Letter to USTR, supra note 128. 
145. William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup d'Etat: Has the Clinton Ad-
ministration Passed the Test?, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF., July 9, 1993, § Sum-
maries & Analysis. 
146. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Leader Is Pressed* to Yield Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 1, 1993, at A7. 
147. Tim Golden, Guatemala's Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 1993, at A3. 
148. Id. 
149. David Scott Clark, Guatemalans and the U.S. Put Pressure on President to 
Restore Democracy: Labor, Political and Religious Groups Mount Protests as U.S. 
Places Aid and Trade Benefits Under Review, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May 28, 
1993, at 7. As one commentator reported: "Union leaders are cautious. They want to 
gauge how much international sympathy (and thus some measure of protection) there 
is for direct action against Serrano . . . . 'We're not all meeting together, and we're 
staying in different locations/ says Dino Arana of the Union of Guatemalan Work-
ers." Id. 
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tional outcry forced him to abdicate.150 On June 1, 1993, his vice pres-
ident, Gustavo Espina Salguero, announced his intent to assume the 
presidency, again with the support of the military, but Espina lasted no 
more than five days.151 On June 5, 1993, the reconvened Guatemalan 
Congress elected Ramiro Deleon Carpio, an independent human rights 
special counsel and leading Guatemalan human rights advocate, as the 
new president.152 
While the timing may have been coincidental, the pending decision on 
Guatemala's GSP status proved to be a decisive policy tool for the 
United States in influencing the restoration of constitutional rule and the 
surprising accession of a promising human rights leader to the presiden-
cy.153 At news of the coup, the United States labor rights petitioners 
immediately met with USTR and State Department officials and de-
manded a removal of Guatemala's GSP benefits unless it restored con-
stitutional rule.154 In response, the State Department issued a statement 
that "unless democracy is restored in Guatemala, GSP benefits are likely 
to be withdrawn."155 
Early press commentary cited the leverage in the GSP decision: 
But perhaps more damaging to the local economy and Mr. Serrano's 
cause could be the call by U.S. labor rights groups to revoke Guatemalan 
industry's tariff-free access to the United States market for certain prod-
ucts . . . . Guatemala's labor practices are already under review by the 
United States Trade Representative's office . . . . Given Serrano's suspen-
sion of the right of public protest and strikes, analysts expect U.S. Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor to consider terminating Guatemala's trade 
benefits.156 
150. Tim Golden, Guatemala's Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 1993, at A3. 
151. Guatemala: Serrano Ousted from Power, Congress elects Ramiro de Leon 
Carpio as President, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF., June 11, 1993, § Party Politics 
& Elections. 
152. Id. 
153. William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup d'Etat: Has the Clinton Ad-
ministration Passed the Test?, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF., July 9, 1993, § Sum-
maries & Analysis. 
154. See U.S. Aid Freeze on Guatemala to Stay for Now, REUTERS, June 2, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (discussing the interruption of aid 
after the coup). 
155. Jared Kotler, Keep the Ecomonic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders, MIAMI HER-
ALD (infl ed.), June 7, 1993, at 11 A. 
156. David Scott Clark, Guatemalans and the U.S. Put Pressure on President to 
Restore Democracy: Labor, Political and Religious Groups Mount Protests as US. 
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The New York Times also noted the impending labor rights sanctions 
as critical to Serrano's fate, reporting that on the day before his abdica-
tion, "businessmen have panicked at a threat by the United States to 
withdraw Guatemala's trade benefits under the Generalized System of 
Preferences."157 A controlling factor lending to Serrano's downfall was 
the concern of Guatemala's business leaders that rising exports to the 
United States and Europe could be devastated if the United States im-
posed the threatened sanctions. Within hours of the United States* threat 
to cut Guatemala's trade benefits, business leaders who had previously 
supported authoritarian rule began pressing government and military 
officials to reverse Mr. Serrano's action.158 
Continual pressure quickly ended the Espina presidency bid, facilitated 
a clean break with military-dominated governance of Guatemala's ruling 
elite, and resulted in the inauguration of Deleon Carpio as President on 
June 6, 1993.159 On June 25, United States Trade Representative Mick-
ey Kantor announced that Guatemala would remain a GSP beneficiary 
country at least during a six month "continuing review" period: "If 
countries fail to make substantial concrete progress in addressing worker 
rights concerns during this time, their GSP benefits will be in serious 
jeopardy."160 
In addition to the labor rights issue, the conclusion of Guatemala's 
Ambassador to the United States who opposed the coup is similarly 
important: 6The true heroes of the drama are the Guatemalan people, 
who simply would not permit the trashing of their constitution — a 
constitution owed to thousands and thousands massacred, kidnapped, 
tortured and disappeared . . . . Their response to the coup was a virtual 
revolution."161 The GSP labor rights petition, however, was still a for-
Places Aid and Trade Benefits Under Review, CHRISTIAN So. MONITOR, May 28, 
1993, at 7. 
157. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Leader Is Pressed to Yield Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 1, 1993, at A7. 
158. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 1993, at A3. 
159. George Rodriguez, Guatemala: Hunted Official Now Governs his Former 
Hunters, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
CURRNT File. 
160. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Kantor Announces 
Results of 1992 GSP Reviews: Emphasis on Worker Rights Is Underscored, No. 93-
42 (June 25, 1993) (press release). 
161. Edmond Mulet, The Palace Coup Tliat Failed, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at 
A23. 
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tuitous policy instrument available at just the right time to have a pro-
nounced effect on events in Guatemala.162 This effect demonstrated the 
potential power of international labor rights advocacy in a world marked 
by the intertwining of national and regional economies with continuing 
struggle for democracy and social justice.163 
3. Litigating Guatemala Labor Rights in United States Courts 
As disputes over Guatemala's GSP status continued, United States 
labor rights advocates turned to a new strategy to help end one of the 
longest and most bitter labor disputes in Guatemala: using United States 
courts as a forum for asserting international labor claims.164 
The dispute arose when a United States owner of International de 
Exportaciones ("Inexport", an apparel factory) fired the union leadership 
committee and more than one hundred union supporters after they 
formed a union in 1989 and demanded bargaining.165 The owner 
claimed the unionists were communists and guerilla sympathizers166 and 
hired armed guards to patrol the factory floor and frighten other workers 
into submission.167 The guards also assaulted fired workers who staged 
a protest at the factory gate.165 
The Inexport owner's actions violated both international labor 
norms169 and the Guatemalan labor code.170 In proceedings before the 
162. See William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup d'Etat: Has the Clinton 
Administration Passed the Test?, NOTlSUR-LATlN AM. POL. AFF., July 9, 1993, § 
Summaries & Analysis (discussing Washington's great influence on the Guatemalan 
political atmosphere). 
163. Id. 
164. See Memorandum from Kurt Petersen and Paul Sonn to Michael Ratner et al. 
(Dec. 11, 1991) (on file with ILRERF) (discussing Inexport case and possible jurisdic-
tions). 
165. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. The factory was one of the largest gar-
ment making facilities in Guatemala, with over five hundred workers. Id. at 48. Es-
tablished in the 1970s, the factory was later converted to maquila status under the 
special maquila incentive laws passed in 1984 to enhance export-led development in 
Guatemala. Id. 
166. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. 
167. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. 
168. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 128-35. 
169. See ELO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 1919-1991 (1992) (including Convention No. 87 regarding freedom of 
association, and Convention No. 98 regarding the right to organize collectively). Gua-
temala had ratified ILO Conventions guaranteeing the right of association and the 
right to organize and to bargain collectively. Id. 
170. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129-30 (stating that Guatemalan courts repeat-
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Labor Court of Guatemala, the workers won judicial orders for reinstate-
ment and back pay. On appeal, the Labor Court upheld these orders.171 
The company owners, however, never complied with the court orders, 
and the courts never took steps to enforce their orders.172 Three years 
after the firings, the workers still remained unemployed.173 United 
States labor rights supporters first cited the Inexport case in GSP peti-
tions, but the TPSC argued that the case had not yet been adjudicat-
ed.174 
Labor rights advocates, therefore, attempted to "bring the litigation 
home" to courts in the United States.175 Lawyers and law students from 
the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, the U.S.-
Guatemala Labor Education Project, the Center for Constitutional Rights 
and the Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School, with pro 
bono assistance from two Washington, D.C. law firms and attorneys in 
Miami, Florida, devised a plan to sue the United States owner of the 
Guatemalan factory on behalf of the fired workers.175 
The United States "Inexport Team" traced the owner's sales and 
distribution operations to find possible United States judicial forums 
which had jurisdiction.177 They discovered that the company's distribu-
tion headquarters were based in Miami, Florida, and had substantial 
funds in Florida banks.178 They also learned that Inexport's largest cus-
tomers were in New York City, the site of accounts payable to the 
Miami sales office. 
While the strategists examined the potential claims under international 
labor rights norms, they decided instead to adopt a more prosaic cause 
of action that arose often in the international business context: to en-
force the judgment of the Guatemalan courts under established principles 
edly have declared as illegal the retaliatory and violent actions taken by the owner of 
Inexport). 
171. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. 
172. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. 
173. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 130. 
174. See USTR, GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Worker 
Rights Review Summary; Petitions Not Accepted For Review (Guatemala, 1990 & 
1991) (on file with USTR and ILRERF) (indicating that the GSP subcommittee woudl 
not consider the Inexport case as long as it was still being adjudicated in the Guate-
malan courts). 
175. Memorandum from Paul Sonn and Kurt Petersen to Michal Ratner et ah. 
Inexport Team (Dec. 22, 1991) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.). 
176. Id. 
177. Id 
178. Id 
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of comity rather than a vague claim that still-evolving international labor 
rights norms were violated.179 Although a United States'court could not 
enforce a reinstatement order, it could satisfy the judgment of the Gua-
temalan courts by ordering back pay for the workers from the company 
assets in the United States.180 
In early 1992, the Inexport Team chose to pursue this route, and 
drafted pleadings for submission to a Florida state court that targeted the 
assets of the distribution company.181 Team attorneys also prepared 
pleadings to submit to a New York state court that would seek to gar-
nish accounts payable to Inexport by New York customers of the com-
pany.182 Additionally, a delegation from the legal team visited Guate-
mala in March 1992, to secure certified judgment papers from the Gua-
temalan courts, to work with the union there to identify and consult 
with named plaintiffs in the case, and to take affidavits from fired work-
ers.183 
In April 1992, the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor convened new, 
tripartite negotiations among the ministry, Inexport's owner, and the 
union in an effort to resolve the dispute.184 The labor rights legal team 
delayed filing the lawsuit to await the results of these negotiations.183 
In July, the parties reached a settlement. The fired workers were rein-
stated, a schedule of back pay payments over a seventeen-month period 
was implemented, and the union was recognized as the bargaining agent 
for employees.186 
CONCLUSION 
These case studies of strategies and tactics developed by labor rights 
advocates in the United States in connection with NAFTA, and in sup-
port of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, amount to a preliminary 
survey of the field. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Inexport Team, Draft Pleadings for the Inexport Case (Apr. 15, 1992) (on file 
with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.). 
182. Id. 
183. Memorandum from Paul Sonn and Kurt Petersen to the Inexport Team (un-
dated) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.). 
184. Memorandum from Kurt Petersen to the Inexport Team (July 27, 1992) (on 
file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.). 
185. Id. 
186. Memorandum from Lance Compa to the Inexport Team (Sept. 1, 1992) (on 
file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.). 
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These accounts of actions by United States labor rights advocates on 
behalf of workers and unions in the transnational economy, however, are 
not intended to overstate their results. First, although the Clinton Admin-
istration did sign the labor agreement,157 critics contend that the 
NAFTA text as it stands contains serious flaws: a secretive dispute reso-
lution process that shuts out labor, environmental, and human rights 
voices; imbalances in tariff reduction schedules that will accelerate Unit-
ed States and Canadian job losses; clauses that override efforts by state 
and local governments to protect their citizens,1*3 and inadequate "side 
agreements" on labor rights and labor standards.1*9 
Similarly, notwithstanding a series of concrete victories in Guatemalan 
labor disputes, the military and the land- and business-owning elite 
continue to dominate Guatemala. Similarly, fewer than six out of the 
three hundred maquila factories in the export processing sector recognize 
unions.190 United States and Guatemalan labor rights supporters, there-
fore, must continue to assist workers against what remains a constant, 
defensive struggle against great odds. 
The importance of these case studies lies in their evocation of the 
possibilities for expanded labor rights advocacy in international trade. 
The growing volume of labor rights controversies outlined in Part I, and 
the growing number of arenas surveyed in Part II where labor rights 
claims can be asserted and adjudicated in some form, with varying 
degrees of effective enforcement, suggest how workers, unions, human 
rights proponents, and other private labor advocates can become potent 
actors in the transnational economy. The NAFTA and Guatemala labor 
rights case studies show how at least some of these arenas can be used 
to advance workers rights: labor standards in bilateral or multilateral 
trade agreements; use of labor rights clauses in United States trade stat-
utes; creative litigation strategies; invocation of ILO Conventions and 
other international norms. 
A strong, enforceable regime of international labor rights ensures, or 
187. See Peter Behr, Kantor Pitches Trade Pact on Hill; Official Says NAFTA 
Offers Many Benefits for United States Economy, Jobs, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1993, 
at A9 (describing USTR's promotion of NAFTA to legislators). 
188. See NAFTA Supplemental Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm. (Mar. 11, 1993) (testimony of Pharis 
Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund). 
189. See LEVINSON, supra note 80 (discussing the shortcomings of the labor side 
agreement). 
190. Interview with Stephen Coats, Executive Director, United States/Guatemala 
Labor Education Project (Mar. 20, 1993). 
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at least tends to ensure, that competitive advantage derives from genu-
ine, natural trade flows without being accelerated by exploitation. With 
ample space for associating and organizing free of repression, workers 
can protect their interests through collective bargaining with multination-
al employers and by pressing their own governments through a demo-
cratic political process for fair labor standards under domestic law. Ag-
gressive international labor rights advocacy can force governments and 
employers to take account finally for the interests, passions, and rights 
of workers and their unions in making policy and investment choices in 
the transnational economy. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Am. U. J. Int’1 L. & Pol’y 150 1993-1994 
